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 
Abstract— Polar codes are novel and efficient error correcting 
codes with low encoding and decoding complexities. These codes 
have a channel dependent generator matrix which is determined 
by the code dimension, code length and transmission channel 
parameters. This paper studies a variant of the McEliece public 
key cryptosystem based on polar codes, called “PKC-PC”. Due to 
the fact that the structure of polar codes’ generator matrix 
depends on the parameters of channel, we used an efficient 
approach to conceal their generator matrix. Then, by the help of 
the characteristics of polar codes and also introducing an 
efficient approach, we reduced the public and private key sizes of 
the PKC-PC and increased its information rate compared to the 
McEliece cryptosystem. It was shown that polar codes are able to 
yield an increased security level against conventional attacks and 
possible vulnerabilities on the code-based public key 
cryptosystems. Moreover, it is indicated that the security of the 
PKC-PC is reduced to solve NP-complete problems. Compared to 
other post-quantum public key schemes, we believe that the 
PKC-PC is a promising candidate for NIST post-quantum crypto 
standardization. 
  
Index Terms— Channel Coding, McEliece Cryptosystem, 
Polar Codes, Public Key Cryptography 
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
T has been revealed that the conventional used public key 
cryptosystems, whose security are based on the difficulty of 
discrete logarithm or factoring problems, are broken by the 
quantum computers in polynomial-time [1]. One of the 
important categories of cryptosystems which can resist 
quantum computer-based attacks is code-based cryptosystems. 
These kinds of cryptosystems can be considered as 
alternatives to the conventional public key cryptosystems, 
such as RSA and ElGamal [2]. The security of most of these 
cryptosystems relies on the hardness of some conventional 
problems in coding theory [3]. For example, it was previously 
shown that the decoding of a linear code with no clear 
structure is NP-complete problem [4]. The first public key 
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code-based cryptosystem originally proposed based on the 
binary Goppa codes is McEliece cryptosystem [5]. This 
cryptosystem applies a binary Goppa codes’ generator matrix, 
a scrambling matrix, and a permuting matrix as the private 
key. The scrambling and permuting matrices are employed to 
convert the private key into the public matrix. The McEliece 
cryptosystem applies the generator matrix and encodes the 
information vector into the public code’s codewords. 
Compared to the conventional public key cryptosystems, 
McEliece cryptosystem has low complexity encryption/ 
decryption algorithms. Nevertheless, due to the use of binary 
Goppa codes, this cryptosystem has two major weaknesses 
[6]: (i) low transmission rate, and (ii) huge key size.  
One of efficient approaches to resolve the weaknesses of 
McEliece cryptosystem is exchanging binary Goppa codes 
with the other linear block codes. However, such replacement 
can yield serious flaws in its security level. Thus far, several 
schemes have been proposed to dominate the weaknesses of 
McEliece scheme by exchanging the Goppa codes with the 
different linear codes such as generalized Reed–Solomon 
(GRS) codes  [7], Reed–Muller codes [8], quasi cyclic low 
density parity check (QC-LDPC) codes [9-11], wild Goppa 
codes [12, 13], p-adic Goppa codes [11, 14], moderate density 
parity check (MDPC) codes [15, 16], convolutional codes [17] 
and more recently low density lattice codes (LDLCs) [18]. 
Some of these suggested yields decrease the public key length 
while keeping the same security level against the conventional 
attacks. However, most of them exposed the McEliece 
cryptosystem to security threats and yield serious flaws in its 
security level. For example, public key schemes based on GRS 
and Reed-Muller codes were broken in [19] and [20], 
respectively. A number of versions of LDPC code-based 
schemes [9, 10] have been successfully cryptanalyzed with 
efficient attacks in [21, 22]. Some of the parameters that can 
be found in public key schemes based on wild Goppa codes 
[12, 13] have been successfully cryptanalyzed in [23, 24]. In 
addition, the convolutional code-based scheme [17] was 
successfully cryptanalyzed by Landais and Tillich in [25]. 
Moreover, the cryptosystems based on p-adic Goppa codes 
[11, 14] were broken in [26]. 
Polar codes [27] are novel family of codes which, by the 
help of successive cancellation (SC) decoding, can attain the 
information theoretic bounds in channel coding. Up to now, by 
applying the properties of polar codes, many attempts have 
been made to achieve secrecy in information theoretic security 
[28]. However, several researches have been carried out in 
recent years to introduce the polar code-based cryptographic 
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schemes. The employing of polar codes in the construction of 
symmetric key cryptosystems is presented in [29, 30]. Also, 
by performing the properties of finite-length polar codes, 
physical layer encryption (PLE) schemes are presented in [31, 
32] to make secure communication between legitimate 
partners against active and passive adversaries. In [33, 34], 
polar code-based versions of McEliece cryptosystem are 
introduced. However, in [35], Bardet et.al have presented a 
key-recovery attack against recently Shrestha-Kim [34] polar 
code-based public key scheme. This type of key-recovery 
attack makes Shrestha-Kim scheme possible to obtain all the 
needed information for decryption of any message. In 
addition, it allows breaking such version of McEliece 
cryptosystem for the parameters suggested by Shrestha and 
Kim. Although, the only approach to prevent this type of 
attack is to find polar code parameters for which finding 
minimum weight codewords is impossible. This requires 
changing significantly the parameters proposed in [34]. 
Moreover, it is shown that such key recovery attack is not 
directly applicable to another public key scheme presented in 
[33] which is based on random subcode of the polar code [35].  
In this paper, a secure and reliable polar code-based public 
key scheme is introduced to resolve the weaknesses of the 
original McEliece scheme. Due to the following reasons, it is 
rational to study whether polar codes are convenient to use in 
a McEliece-like public key scheme: (i) polar codes have better 
error correction capability than Goppa code which allows 
decreasing of the key length of the polar code-based scheme; 
(ii) the SC decoding of polar codes is performed faster than 
decoding of Goppa codes which yields decreasing the 
computational complexity of the decryption process; (iii) the 
polar codes have large equivalent family by which attacking 
the polar code-based scheme to dissolve the code equivalence 
problem is infeasible; and (iv) since polar codes have large 
hull and large permutation group, executing support splitting 
algorithm (SPA) algorithm is doomed to fail for polar code-
based scheme [35]. In the PKC-PC, we conceal the polar 
codes’ generator matrix by random selection of its 𝑘 rows from 
an 𝑛 × 𝑛 square matrix. The advantage of random selection in 
this method is that the opponent cannot obtain the needed data 
to decode the predetermined polar codeword. In addition, by 
exploiting the properties of polar codes, we use the encryption 
matrix of the PKC-PC in systematic form. Moreover, the 
nonsingular matrix is obtained from the generator matrix of 
employed polar code. These proceedings yield a reduction in 
the private and public key sizes and also have an increment in 
the security level.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes the characteristics of polar codes. We discuss the 
idea of applying polar codes in the construction of the PKC-
PC in Section III. Moreover, the design issues of our scheme 
are explained. The efficiency level of the PKC-PC is assessed 
in Section IV. In fact, we compute the error performance, key 
size and the computational complexity of the PKC-PC and 
then compare it with original McEliece and other McEliece-
like schemes. To investigate the security level, we consider the 
security reduction in Section V. Also, we show that the PKC-
PC has high enough security level by choosing the proper 
values of the parameters. Finally, the conclusion of this paper 
is presented in Section VI.  
II. POLAR CODES 
Polar codes are very powerful category of linear codes that 
demonstrably attain any Binary-input Discrete Memoryless 
Channel’s (B-DMC) capacity, e.g., Binary Erasure Channel 
(BEC) [27] and Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC). Let 
𝑊 ∶ 𝒳 →  𝒴 be a B-DMC. Consider 𝒳 = {0, 1} as an input 
alphabet, 𝒴 as an output alphabet and {𝑊(𝒚|𝒙), 𝒙 ∈  𝒳, 𝒚 ∈ 𝒴} 
as the transition probabilities of 𝑊. Let us consider 𝐼(𝑊) ≜
∑ ∑
1
2
𝑊(𝒚|𝒙)log𝒙 ∈ 𝒳𝒚∈𝒴
𝑊(𝒚|𝒙)
1
2
𝑊(𝒚|0)+
1
2
𝑊(𝒚|1)
 and 
𝑍(𝑊) ≜ ∑ √𝑊(𝒚|0)𝑊(𝒚|1)𝒚∈𝒴  for 𝑊, where 𝐼(𝑊) ∈ [0, 1] is 
called the capacity for 𝑊 and hence performed for measuring 
the rate. Also, 𝑍(𝑊) ∈ [0, 1] is called the Bhattacharyya 
parameter of 𝑊 and applied to measure the reliability. In this 
case, 𝐼(𝑊 ) ≈ 1 iff 𝑍(𝑊) ≈ 0, also 𝐼(𝑊 ) ≈ 0 iff 𝑍(𝑊) ≈ 1. If 𝑊 
is a BEC with erasure probability 𝜖, i.e., BEC(𝜖), then we have 
𝑍(𝑊) = 𝜖 and  𝐼(𝑊) = 1 − 𝑍(𝑊) = 1 − 𝜖. Let {𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)
: 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛}  
be a set of polarized channels, called sub-channels or bit-
channels, with indices ʻ𝑖ʼ that are obtained by applying the 
channel polarization process on the 𝑛 independent copies of a 
B-DMC 𝑊. If 𝑛 is large enough, the 𝑛 sub-channel’s 
capacities {𝐼 (𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)) , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛} and the 𝑛 sub-channel’s 
Bhattacharya parameters {𝑍 (𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)) , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛} will be 0 or 1. 
Let ℐ𝑛 = {𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛} be an 𝑛 sub-channel indices set. 
Consider 𝒜 ⊂ ℐ𝑛 as a 𝑘-element information set and 𝒜
𝑐 ⊂ ℐ𝑛 
as an (𝑛 − 𝑘)-element frozen (fixed) set. For all 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒜𝑐, 
we have  𝑍 (𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)) ≤ 𝑍 (𝑊𝑛
(𝑗)
) and 𝐼 (𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)) ≥ 𝐼 (𝑊𝑛
(𝑗)
). In fact, 
for 𝑛 sub-channels, 𝑛𝐼(𝑊) sub-channels (with indices in 𝒜) 
become noiseless or reliable and 𝑛(1 − 𝐼(𝑊 )) sub-channels 
(with indices in 𝒜𝑐) become unreliable or noisy [27]. 
A. Constructing the Generator and Parity-Check Matrices 
Consider 𝑛 = 2𝑚, 𝑚 ≥ 1 and 𝐺2 = [
1 0
1 1
]. Also, consider the 
𝑚-th Kronecker product 𝐺2
⊗𝑚 which yields an 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix. 
One interesting property of matrix 𝐺2
⊗𝑚 for polar codes is 
shown in Remark 1 [36]:  
Remark 1: Let (𝐺𝑛)𝒜𝒜  denotes the submatrix of 𝐺𝑛 consisting 
of the array of elements 𝐺𝑖,𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒜. Any submatrix (𝐺𝑛)𝒜𝒜 , 
𝒜 ⊂ {1, ⋯ , 𝑛} is also a lower-triangular matrix and has 1s on 
the diagonal, so it is also nonsingular (invertible). 
Given the rate 𝑅 < 𝐼(𝑊) and dimension 𝑘 = 𝑛𝑅, a 𝑘 × 𝑛 
generator matrix 𝐺𝒜 is obtained for any polar code of length  𝑛 
and dimension 𝑘 with the subsequent steps [37]: 
1) First, the rows of 𝐺𝑛 are labeled from the first to the last 
row as 𝑖 = 1, 2,· · · , 𝑛. For BEC(𝜖), 𝑍 (𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)),  1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 are 
obtained as follows: (i) ∀1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙,  𝑙 = 1, 2, 22, ⋯ , 2𝑚−1 
 𝑍 (𝑊2𝑙
(𝑖)) = 2𝑍 (𝑊𝑙
(𝑖)) − 𝑍2 (𝑊𝑙
(𝑖)); (ii) ∀𝑘 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 2𝑙, 
𝑍 (𝑊2𝑙
(𝑖)) = 𝑍2 (𝑊𝑙
(𝑖−𝑙)). A permutation 𝜋𝑛 = (𝑖1, . . . , 𝑖𝑛) is 
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formed for 𝑛 sub-channel indices set ℐ𝑛 = {1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑛} such 
that 𝑍 (𝑊𝑛
(𝑖𝑗)) ≤ 𝑍 (𝑊𝑛
(𝑖𝑘)), 1 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛. 
2) The information set 𝒜 ⊂ ℐ𝑛 is obtained whose indices of 
sub-channels correspond to 𝑘 leftmost indices in 𝜋𝑛, i.e., 
𝑖1, . . . , 𝑖𝑘. The 𝑘 × 𝑛 generator matrix 𝐺𝒜 is obtained by 
choosing 𝑘 rows of 𝐺𝑛 related to the information set 
indices 𝒜. 
3) The frozen set 𝒜𝑐 ⊂ ℐ𝑛 is obtained whose indices of sub-
channels correspond to (𝑛 − 𝑘) rightmost indices in 𝜋𝑛, 
i.e. 𝑖𝑘+1, 𝑖𝑘+2, . . . , 𝑖𝑛. The (𝑛 − 𝑘) × 𝑛 frozen matrix 𝐺𝒜𝑐 is 
generated by choosing (𝑛 − 𝑘) rows of 𝐺𝑛 related to the 
frozen indices set 𝒜𝑐. 
In the (𝑛, 𝑘) non-systematic polar codes, an input vector 
𝒖 = (𝑢1, 𝑢2, ⋯ , 𝑢𝑛) = (𝒖𝒜 , 𝒖𝒜𝑐 ) consists of 𝑘-bit information 
subvector 𝒖𝒜 = (𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜) and (𝑛 − 𝑘)-bit frozen (fixed) 
subvector 𝒖𝒜𝑐 = (𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜
𝑐). The information subvector 𝒖𝒜  
consists of information data that can be changed in 
transmission process. The frozen subvector consists of fixed 
values known to decoder [36]. Polar codes are defined in 
terms of an invertible map 𝐺𝑛 via 𝒙 = 𝒖𝐺𝑛. The matrix 
𝐺𝑛 = 𝐵𝑛𝐺2
⊗𝑚, where 𝐵𝑛 is a bit-reversal permutation matrix 
defined in [27]. The construction of polar codes’ parity check 
matrix is characterized as the lemma 1 [38]: 
Lemma 1: Let 𝒜 be an information set and let 𝒜𝑐 be a 
frozen set of an (𝑛, 𝑘) polar code. Let 𝐺𝑛 = 𝐵𝑛𝐺2
⊗𝑚 be an 𝑛 × 𝑛 
matrix consist of the generator matrix 𝐺𝒜 and the frozen 
matrix 𝐺𝒜𝑐. Also, assuming that frozen vector 𝒖𝒜𝑐  is all-zero 
vector. In this case, the parity check matrix 𝐻𝑛×𝑟, 𝑟 = 𝑛 − 𝑘 is 
constructed by selecting the columns of 𝐺𝑛 with indices in 𝒜
𝑐. 
Proof. Similar to the Lemma 1’s proof in [38]. 
B. Polar Encoding 
In the polar encoding process, the input vector 𝒖 =
(𝒖𝒜 , 𝒖𝒜𝑐 ) is converted to 𝑛-bit codeword 𝒙 = 𝒖𝒜𝐺𝒜 +
𝒖𝒜𝑐 𝐺𝒜𝑐 = 𝒖𝒜𝐺𝒜 + 𝑐, where 𝑐 ≜ 𝒖𝒜𝑐𝐺𝒜𝑐  is a fixed vector. The 
code rate is obtained as 𝑅 = |𝒖𝒜| |𝒙|⁄ = |𝒜| 𝑛⁄ . The 
information vector is sent across the noiseless sub-channels at 
a rate close to one. In addition, the frozen (fixed) vector is sent 
across the noisy sub-channels at a rate close to zero [27]. 
C. Successive Cancelation (SC) Decoding 
Consider 𝒙 as an 𝑛-bit polar code’s codeword that is sent 
along the 𝑛 sub-channels. Consider 𝒚 = 𝑦1
𝑛 as a related channel 
output vector. The main aim of SC decoding is to compute the 
evaluated input vector ?̂? using information set 𝒜, frozen 
vector 𝒖𝒜𝑐  and channel output vector 𝒚. In fact, for 𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)
, 𝑖 =
 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑛, the SC decoding computes the likelihood ratio (LR) 
of bits of input vector 𝑢𝑖 given 𝒚 and the past obtained 
information bits ?̂?1
𝑖−1 as 𝐿𝑛
(𝑖)
=
𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)
(𝑦1
𝑛,𝑢1
𝑖−1|𝑢𝑖=0)
𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)
(𝑦1
𝑛,𝑢1
𝑖−1|𝑢𝑖=1)
. The input vector 
bits are obtained with the help of SC decoding as follows: (i) 
∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒜𝑐, ?̂?𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖; (ii) ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒜, ?̂?𝑖 = ℎ𝑖(𝑦1
𝑛, ?̂?1
𝑖−1). The decision 
functions ℎ𝑖: 𝒴
𝑛 × 𝒳𝑖−1 → 𝒳, 𝑖 ∈ 𝒜 are obtained for all 
𝑦1
𝑛 ∈ 𝒴𝑛, ?̂?1
𝑖−1 ∈ 𝒳𝑖−1 as follows: (i) ∀ 𝐿𝑛
(𝑖)
≥ 1, ℎ𝑖(𝑦1
𝑛, ?̂?1
𝑖−1) = 0 
and (ii) otherwise, ℎ𝑖(𝑦1
𝑛 , ?̂?1
𝑖−1) = 1. The upper bound on error 
probability with the SC decoder is obtained as 𝑃𝑒 ≤
∑ 𝑍 (𝑊𝑛
(𝑖))𝑖∈𝒜  for any B-DMC 𝑊 [27]. Moreover, it is shown 
that reliable communication can be achieved under SC 
decoding by satisfying the inequality (1) [39], 
                                      𝑅 < 𝐼(𝑊) − 𝑛−1 𝜇⁄ ,                          (1) 
where 𝜇 is named scaling exponent and its values depend on 
the channel type. For example, we have 𝜇 ≈ 3.627 for BEC. 
The maximum possible 𝑅 satisfying (1) is called cutoff rate 
and shown by 𝑅0.  
III. THE PROPOSED POLAR CODE-BASED PUBLIC KEY SCHEME  
Here, first efficient techniques are presented to categorize 
the sub-channels and also conceal the polar codes’ generator 
matrix. Then, we explain the construction of the PKC-PC.  
A. Good and Bad Sub-Channels 
For the PKC-PC, we categorize all 𝑛 sub-channels 
{𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)
: 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛} into good and bad sub-channels as 
definitions 1 and 2 [29]: 
Definition 1. The 𝑛𝑅0 sub-channels are considered as good 
sub-channels if they have minimum Bhattacharya parameters 
among all 𝑛 sub-channels, i.e., minimum error probability. 
The good sub-channels’ indices are related to the 𝑛𝑅0 leftmost 
indices of 𝜋𝑛 and shown as 𝒢𝑛(𝑊, 𝑅0) = {𝑖 ∈ ℐ𝑛: 𝜋𝑛(𝑖) ∈
{𝑖1, 𝑖2, ⋯ , 𝑖𝑛𝑅0}}.                                                                                  ■ 
Definition 2. The 𝑛(1 − 𝑅0) sub-channels are considered as 
bad sub-channels if they have maximum Bhattacharya 
parameters among all 𝑛 sub-channels, i.e., maximum error 
probability. The bad sub-channels’ indices are related to the 
𝑛(1 − 𝑅0) rightmost indices of 𝜋𝑛 and shown as ℬ𝑛(𝑊, 𝑅0) =
{𝑖 ∈ ℐ𝑛: 𝜋𝑛(𝑖) ∈ {𝑖𝑛𝑅0+1, 𝑖𝑛𝑅0+2, ⋯ , 𝑖𝑛}}.                                           ■ 
In the PKC-PC, we consider the transmission over the 
noiseless insecure channel. In this case, all 𝑛 sub-channels are 
considered as the good sub-channels. Therefore, we can use 
high transmission rate, e.g. 0.9, in the PKC-PC. In fact, the 
information rate of PKC-PC is increased significantly 
compared to the McEliece cryptosystem. 
B. Concealing the Generator Matrix 
To hide the polar codes’ generator matrix, an efficient 
approach is being proposed in the following steps by which an 
adversary cannot obtain the concealed polar codes’ generator 
matrix:  
1) First, 𝑘 indices are chosen randomly from 𝒢𝑛(𝑊, 𝑅0). In 
fact, this process is related to the random selection of 𝑘 
sub-channels from the set of good sub-channels. The 
arbitrarily 𝑘 chosen indices from 𝒢𝑛(𝑊, 𝑅0) are named as 
the secret information set and shown by 𝒜(𝑠). The secret 
generator matrix, 𝐺𝒜(𝑠), is constructed as a 𝑘 × 𝑛 
submatrix of 𝐺𝑛 with 𝑘 selected rows corresponding to 
𝒜(𝑠). 
2) The secret frozen set, 𝒜𝑐(𝑠), is a subset of ℐ𝑛 whose 
(𝑛 − 𝑘) indices are not selected from ℐ𝑛 in step 1. Also, 
the secret frozen matrix 𝐺𝒜𝑐(𝑠) is constructed as an 
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(𝑛 − 𝑘) × 𝑛 submatrix of 𝐺𝑛 whose rows are selected 
related to 𝒜𝑐(𝑠).  
In this way, the secret generator matrix 𝐺𝒜(𝑠) cannot be 
recovered by the adversary even if 𝜖, 𝑛 and 𝑘 are known. In 
fact, by concealing the 𝐺𝒜(𝑠), the attacker cannot recover the 
estimated input vector ?̂? from the channel output vector 𝒚 in 
polynomial-time. Fig. 1 shows the proposed concept of 
concealing the generator matrix and encoding to enhance the 
security based on an (𝑛, 𝑘) polar code.  
Good 
sub-channels
𝑛  
 
𝑘  
 
randomly
selected good
sub-channels
𝑛 − 𝑘 
remained 
sub-channels 
 
                                                       (a) 
Frozen (Fixed) 
vector 
Secret Information 
Vector
𝑘 randomly 
chosen good 
sub-channels 
𝑥1  
 
𝑥2   
 
𝑥𝑛   
 
𝑛 − 𝑘 
remained 
sub-channels 
Codeword
   (b) 
Fig. 1. The idea of providing security and encoding based on an (𝑛, 𝑘) polar 
code. (a) The 𝑘 sub-channels are randomly chosen from 𝑛 good sub-channels. 
(b) The secret information vector is sent through 𝑘 randomly chosen good 
sub-channels. Moreover, the fixed bits (zeros) are sent across (𝑛 − 𝑘) non-
selected sub-channels. 
As observed in Fig. 1(a), 𝑘 sub-channels are arbitrarily chosen 
from the good sub-channels to conceal the generator matrix 
𝐺𝒜(𝑠). The idea in Figure 1(b) is to transmit the secret 
information vector, denoted by 𝒖𝒜(𝑠), across 𝑘 randomly 
chosen good sub-channels while transmitting the fixed vector, 
denoted by 𝒖𝒜𝑐(𝑠), through the (𝑛 − 𝑘) remained sub-channels. 
Since the error performance of polar codes does not depend on 
the case in which 𝒖𝒜𝑐(𝑠) is chosen, it makes no difference how 
this vector is selected. Hence, an (𝑛 − 𝑘)-bit all-zero vector is 
considered as 𝒖𝒜𝑐(𝑠) in the encrypting/decrypting algorithms 
of the PKC-PC to make its simplified structure. 
C. Key Generation 
The key generating algorithm performs as follows: 
1) A secret generator matrix 𝐺𝒜(𝑠) is generated (see Sec. 
III.B). 
2) A 𝑘 × 𝑘 scrambling matrix 𝑆 is generated by extracting a 
submatrix (𝐺𝑛)𝒜(𝑠)𝒜(𝑠) from 𝐺𝑛 (see Sec. III.B).  
3) An 𝑛 × 𝑛 binary permuting matrix 𝑃 = [𝑃′|𝑃′′] is 
generated. In this case, 𝑃′ is the 𝑛 × 𝑘 submatrix in which 
𝑘 ‘1’s are respectively placed, one in each of 𝑗-th, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝒜(𝑠) rows of its 𝑘 columns. In addition, 𝑃′′ is the 
𝑛 × (𝑛 − 𝑘) submatrix whose (𝑛 − 𝑘) ‘1’s are randomly 
placed in its (𝑛 − 𝑘) columns such that by evaluating the 
positions of 1s in 𝑃𝑛×𝑘
′ , the permuting property of 𝑃𝑛×𝑛 is 
preserved.  
4) The encryption matrix is constructed as 𝐺′ = 𝑆−1𝐺𝒜(𝑠)𝑃. 
D. Private Key 
The set of private key is 𝒦𝑠𝑒𝑐 = {𝒜
𝒸(𝑠), 𝑃}. In the PKC-PC, 
given that the construction of 𝐺𝒜(𝑠) and 𝑆 are based on 𝒜(𝑠), 
it is possible to save 𝒜(𝑠) instead of 𝐺𝒜(𝑠) and 𝑆. Also, the set 
𝒜𝒸(𝑠) is complement to 𝒜(𝑠) and needs less memory to store, 
hence it is enough to save 𝒜𝒸(𝑠) instead of 𝒜(𝑠). This 
concept dramatically leads to reduction of the private key 
length (see Sec. IV.B). Another element of 𝒦𝑠𝑒𝑐  is the 
permutation matrix 𝑃𝑛×𝑛 whose construction is defined in Sec. 
III.C.  
E. Public Key 
The public key is obtained as 𝒦𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝐺
′ = 𝑆−1𝐺𝒜(𝑠)𝑃 =
𝑆−1𝐺′′, where 𝐺′′ = 𝐺𝒜(𝑠)𝑃 is a 𝑘 × 𝑛 matrix. Each of 𝑘 
leftmost columns of 𝐺𝒜(𝑠) are ordered related to 𝑗 ∈ 𝒜(𝑠) 
indices by multiplying 𝐺𝒜(𝑠) and permuting matrix 𝑃 together. 
In such way, 𝐺′′ = [𝑆|𝐺′′′] includes two submatrices: a 𝑘 × 𝑘 
nonsingular submatrix 𝑆 = (𝐺𝑛)𝒜(s)𝒜(s) and a 𝑘 × (𝑛 − 𝑘) 
submatrix 𝐺′′′. Hence, the public key is obtained as a 𝑘 × 𝑛 
matrix 𝒦𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝑆
−1𝐺′′ = [𝐼𝑘|𝑄], where 𝐼𝑘 is a 𝑘 × 𝑘 identity 
submatrix and 𝑄 = 𝑆−1𝐺′′′ is a 𝑘 × (𝑛 − 𝑘) submatrix. With 
the help of this method, the required memory to save the 
public key 𝒦𝑝𝑢𝑏 is 𝑘(𝑛 − 𝑘) bits instead of 𝑘𝑛 bits. In fact, it 
suffices to store 𝑘 × (𝑛 − 𝑘) matrix 𝑄 instead of 𝒦𝑝𝑢𝑏. In this 
way, the large key length problem of the McEliece 
cryptosystem can be solved. It should be noted that in this 
case, the memory requirement of 𝒦𝑝𝑢𝑏 is further reduced by 
increasing the information rate. Also, by employing the 
CCA2-secure Kobara-Imaiʼs 𝛾-conversion [40] for the PKC-
PC, the systematic encryption matrix 𝐺′ does not decrease its 
security level against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. 
F. Encryption 
Bob first randomly selects a code in the family of equivalent 
(𝑛, 𝑘) polar codes by randomly choosing 𝑘 indices from the 
good sub-channel indices. Then, he considers the indices of 𝑘 
selected good sub-channels as 𝒜(𝑠) and constructs 𝐺𝒜(𝑠) for 
the selected polar code. Also, he constructs two other secret 
matrices; a 𝑘 × 𝑘 scrambling matrix 𝑆 and an 𝑛 × 𝑛 permuting 
matrix 𝑃 as in the aforementioned processes in Sec. III.C. In 
addition, Bob generates a public key as 𝐺′ = 𝑆−1𝐺𝒜(𝑠)𝑃. 
Besides, Alice obtains 𝐺′ from the public directory and 
separates the message into 𝑘-bit blocks 𝒎. At last, Alice 
performs the encryption algorithm as 𝒄 = 𝒎𝐺′ + 𝒆, where 𝒆 is 
an arbitrary error vector such that 𝑤𝐻(𝒆) < 𝑡. 
G. Decryption 
The ciphertext 𝒄 is decrypted according to the following 
steps: 
1) First, 𝒄′ = 𝒄𝑃−1 = 𝒎𝑆−1𝐺𝒜(𝑠) + 𝒆𝑃
−1 is computed, where 
𝑃−1 is the inverse of the permutation matrix 𝑃. Given that 
𝑃 is a permutation matrix, we have 𝑤𝐻(𝒆𝑃
−1) = 𝑤𝐻(𝒆). 
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Therefore, 𝒄′ = 𝑐′1
𝑛
 is a codeword in the polar code 
previously chosen and Bob can correct the intentional 
errors with the help of SC decoding to recover 𝒎𝑆−1. 
Since 𝒖𝒜𝑐(𝑠) is full-zero vector, the set {𝒜(𝑠), 𝒄
′} is 
noticed as the SC decoder’s input (See Fig. 2).  
2) The input vector of encoder, 𝒖 = (𝒖𝒜(𝑠), 𝒖𝒜𝑐(𝑠)) =
(𝒎𝑆−1, 0), is evaluated with the help of the SC decoding 
as follows: (i) ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒜𝑐(𝑠), ?̂?𝑖 = 0; (ii) ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒜(𝑠), ?̂?𝑖 =
ℎ𝑖(𝑐
′
1
𝑛, ?̂?1
𝑖−1). In this case, the hard decision function ℎ𝑖 is 
defined as: (i) ∀ 
𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)
(𝑐′1
𝑛
,𝑢1
𝑖−1|𝑢𝑖=0)
𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)
(𝑐′1
𝑛
,𝑢1
𝑖−1|𝑢𝑖=1)
≥ 1, ℎ𝑖(𝑐
′
1
𝑛, ?̂?1
𝑖−1) = 0; (ii) 
otherwise, ℎ𝑖(𝑐
′
1
𝑛 , ?̂?1
𝑖−1) = 1. In other words, if the index 𝑖 
of 𝑊𝑛
(𝑖)
 is not in the secret information set 𝒜(𝑠), then the 
decoder knows that ?̂?𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 = 0.  
3) After the SC decoder maps 𝒄′ into ?̂? = ?̂?1
𝑛, Bob can obtain 
the message as  𝒎 = 𝒖𝒜(𝑠)𝑆.  
As shown in the above steps, 𝒜(𝑠) is needed to execute the 
SC decoding. Therefore, it is impossible for any adversary to 
correct the intentional errors without knowing 𝒜(𝑠). Fig. 2 
shows the block diagram of the PKC-PC.                                                                                                              
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         Fig. 2. Flowchart of the PKC-PC. 
IV. EFFICIENCY ASSESSMENT 
In this section, we measured the error performance, the key 
size and the computational complexity to evaluate the PKC-
PC’s efficiency level. 
A. Error Performance 
As mentioned in Sec. II., the SC decoder estimates the value 
of 𝑖-th input bit, denoted by ?̂?𝑖, given the received vector 
𝒚 = 𝑦1
𝑛 and the prior evaluated input bits ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ⋯ , ?̂?𝑖−1 [27]. 
Therefore, to investigate the Hamming weight’s upper bound 
of 𝒆, the worst case in terms of error correction capability is 
considered for the SC decoding, i.e., when the erasure burst 
has occurred.  
Theorem [41]: Consider a polar code of length 𝑛 = 2𝑚, 
which is constructed for transmission over a BSM channel 𝑊. 
In this case, if an erasure burst of length at least 2√𝑛 −  1 
occurs, the SC decoder always fails to obtain the estimated 
message with probability of at least 0.5. 
Proof. In [41].  
The aforementioned theorem makes an upper bound on the 
error correction capability. For instance, in the PKC-PC, using 
polar code of length 𝑛 = 1024 under SC decoding, the 
Hamming weight’s upper bound of 𝒆 is equal to 63. 
B. Key Size 
In this section, we measure the public and private key 
lengths of the PKC-PC by using (1024, 768) polar code as 
follows: 
1) In the CCA2-secure variants, the encryption matrix can be 
considered in the systematic form which occupies 
𝑘(𝑛 − 𝑘) bits instead of 𝑘𝑛 bits. As the PKC-PC is CCA2-
secure (see Sec. VI.D), we can exploit the systematic 
encryption matrix 𝒦𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝑆
−1𝐺𝒜(𝑠)𝑃 = [𝐼𝑘|𝑄]  as the 
public key. In this case, the public key length ℳ𝑝𝑢𝑏 is 
approximately equal to 24.58 kbytes.  
2) The PKC-PC’s private key includes a set {𝒜𝒸(𝑠), 𝑃}, in 
which 𝒜𝑐(𝑠) is stored instead of 𝐺𝒜(𝑠) and 𝑆. The 
maximum sub-channel index, i.e., 𝑛 = 1024, may be in 
𝒜𝒸(𝑠) which requires 10 bits to store in binary. Therefore, 
the required memory to save 𝒜𝒸(𝑠) is computed as 
ℳ𝒜𝒸(𝑠) ≤ 10(𝑛 − 𝑘) = 2.56 kbits. The required memory to 
save 𝑃𝑛×𝑛 is obtained as ℳ𝑃 = 𝑛(𝑛 − 𝑘) = 32.77 kbits. 
Hence, the private key length’s upper bound is computed 
as ℳ𝑝𝑟𝑖 = ℳ𝒜𝒸(𝑠) + ℳ𝑃 ≤ 32.77  kbytes. 
Table I compares the number of equivalent codes (𝒩𝐶), ℳ𝑝𝑢𝑏, 
𝑅 and the upper bound on 𝑊𝐻(𝒆) of PKC-PC with the 
McEliece scheme. It is obvious that although PKC-PC has 
larger 𝑅 and 𝑘, but its ℳ𝑝𝑢𝑏 is smaller in comparison to the 
McEliece cryptosystem. Moreover, because of randomly 
choosing 𝑘 sub-channels among 𝑛 good sub-channels, the 
equivalent polar codes’ number with the proposed parameters 
is computed as 𝒩𝐶 ≈ 2
826 (see Sec. VI.A), which is much 
larger than the equivalent Goppa codes’ number in the 
McEliece scheme. 
TABLE I 
COMPARING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PKC-PC AND MCELIECE SCHEME. 
 
C. Computational Complexity 
The computational complexity of the PKC-PC includes 
two parts: (i) encryption complexity (∁𝐸𝑛𝑐); and (ii) decryption 
complexity (∁𝐷𝑒𝑐). Encryption is performed by computing the 
product 𝒎𝐺′ and then adding the intentional error vector 𝒆. 
Therefore, the encryption complexity can be expressed as 
∁𝐸𝑛𝑐= ∁𝑚𝑢𝑙(𝒎𝐺
′) + ∁𝑎𝑑𝑑(𝒆), where ∁𝑚𝑢𝑙(𝒎𝐺
′) = 𝒪(𝑘(𝑛 − 𝑘)) 
is the complexity of multiplying 𝒎 by the systematic 
encryption matrix 𝐺′ = [𝐼𝑘|𝑄]. Note that by using CCA2-
secure conversion, the encryption matrix can be put in 
systematic form. In this case, ∁𝑚𝑢𝑙(𝒎𝐺
′) is reduced from 
 𝒪(𝑘𝑛) to 𝒪(𝑘(𝑛 − 𝑘)). Moreover, ∁𝑎𝑑𝑑(𝒆) = 𝒪(𝑛) is the needed 
binary operations’ number for addition of 𝑛-bit 𝒆. Although 
for a CCA2-secure variant implementation, the complexity of 
applying some proper scrambling operations on 𝒎 before 
multiplication by 𝐺′ should be computed. The decryption 
Scheme McEliece [5] PKC-PC 
Code Goppa Polar 
(𝑛, 𝑘) (1024, 524) (256,192) (1024, 768) (1024, 921) 
𝒩𝐶 2
498 ≈ 2204 ≈ 2826 ≈ 2
478 
ℳ𝑝𝑢𝑏 65.5 kbytes 1.5 kbytes 24 kbytes 
11.58 
kbytes 
𝑅 0.512 0.75 0.75 0.9 
Upper bound 
on 𝑊𝐻(𝑒) 
Patterson  
decoding 
SC  
decoding 
SC  
decoding 
SC  
decoding 
50 31 63 63 
Security 
Level 
264.2 279.96 2140.63 2247.98 
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complexity of PKC-PC is computed as  ∁𝐷𝑒𝑐= ∁𝑚𝑢𝑙(𝒄𝑃
−1) +
∁𝑆𝐶(𝒄
′) +  ∁𝑚𝑢𝑙(𝒖𝒜(𝑠)𝑆), where ∁𝑚𝑢𝑙(𝒄𝑃
−1) = 𝒪(𝑛) is the 
needed binary operations’ number to perform the 
multiplication of 𝑛-bit ciphertext 𝒄 by the inverse of 𝑃. Also, 
the SC decoding’s complexity is computed as ∁𝑆𝐶(𝒄
′) =
𝒪(𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛) [27]. Furthermore, the number of required binary 
operations for multiplying the 𝑘-bit vector 𝒖𝒜(𝑠) = 𝒎𝑆
−1 by 𝑆 
is computed as ∁𝑚𝑢𝑙(𝒖𝒜(𝑠)𝑆) = 𝒪(𝑘
2). 
V. FORMAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT  
The security assessment of the PKC-PC is divided into two 
sections: (a) security reduction; (b) practical security. In this 
section, by using the security reduction proposed in [3, 42] for 
the original McEliece cryptosystem based on Goppa codes, we 
provide the reduction regarding the PKC-PC. We demonstrate 
the NP-completeness of some new variants of the hard 
decoding problem which are fitted to the specific polar codes’ 
parameters. In addition, we provide a reduction proof 
regarding the PKC-PC. It implies that an attacker that is able 
to attack the PKC-PC is able to solve the new variants of hard 
decoding problem with a similar effort. Consider 𝒞 as a binary 
polar code with length 𝑛 = 2𝑚. Consider 𝑡 as an error 
correcting capability of 𝒞 and 𝜔 as a positive integer whose 
magnitude is less than 𝑡. In the presented system, the 
adversary is encountered to specify 𝒆 given a vector 𝒄 =
𝒎𝐺′ + 𝒆. Since the Hamming weight 𝜔 of intentional error 
vector 𝒆 is less than 𝑡, the attacker performs a low weight 
word search algorithm to detect 𝒆. In the sequel, we have 
shown that no proper algorithm exists to obtain 𝒆 by the 
adversary. As a matter of fact, PKC-PC’s security is reduced 
to solve the NP-complete problems, called polar 
parameterized syndrome decoding (PPSD) and polar 
parameterized codeword existence (PPCE). In fact, an NP-
complete problem, called three-dimensional matching (TDM), 
is reduced to each of them. The PPSD and PPCE problems 
should be fixed to the (𝑛, 𝑘) polar codes’ properties, i.e., 
𝑛 = 2𝑚, 𝑘 = 𝑛 𝑅⁄  and 𝑡 = 2√𝑛 − 1. It is enough to prove that 
none of PPSD and PPCE can be solved efficiently to ensure 
that no efficient attacker exists against the PKC-PC. Let 𝒫𝑛,𝑘 
be the (𝑛, 𝑘) polar code family whose 𝑘 rows in their generator 
matrices are selected from the 𝑛 rows of 𝐺𝑛. Also, assuming 
that ℋ𝑛,𝑟  is the set of all 𝑛 × 𝑟 matrices whose 𝑟 = 𝑛 − 𝑘 
columns are selected from the columns of 𝐺𝑛
′ = [
𝐺𝒜(𝑠)
𝐺𝒜𝑐(𝑠)
].  
Problem 1 [3]. Three-Dimensional Matching (TDM) 
Instance: a subset 𝑈 ⊆ 𝑇 × 𝑇 × 𝑇, where 𝑇 is a finite set. 
Question: is there a set 𝑊 ⊆ 𝑈 such that |𝑊| = |𝑇|, and no two 
elements of 𝑊 agree in any coordinate? 
Problem 2 [29]. Polar Parameterized Syndrome Decoding 
(PPSD) 
Instance: the parameters ℋ𝑛,𝑟 , 𝑟 = 𝑛 − 𝑘, a matrix 𝐻 ∈ ℋ𝑛,𝑟 , a 
vector 𝒔 ∈ 𝐹2
𝑟 and a nonnegetive integer 𝜔 = 2√𝑛 − 1. 
Question: find 𝒚 ∈ 𝐹2
𝑛 with 𝑤𝐻(𝒚) = 2√𝑛 − 1 in such a way 
that 𝒚𝐻 = 𝒔? 
Proposition 1. The PPSD problem is NP-complete. 
Proof. Inspired by the presented approaches in [3, 42] and by 
reducing the TDM problem to PPSD problem, it can be 
demonstrated that PPSD problem is NP-complete. Consider 𝐵 
as an |𝑈| × |3𝑇| incidence matrix. Each row of 𝐵 includes three 
1s, one for each of the coordinate in the corresponding triple. 
Therefore, detecting an effective solution for the TDM 
problem relates to being a set of |𝑇| rows whose addition in 
𝐺𝐹(2) yields an all one vector. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the 
matrix 𝐵 is expanded to 𝐻1 of size 𝑛 × 𝑟. To perform such 
expansion, 𝑛′ = 𝑛 − |𝑈| full-zero rows and 𝑟′ = 𝑟 − 3|𝑇| full-
zero columns is added to 𝐵. Such extension is performed to 
put the matrix 𝐵 suitable for the properties of PPSD problem. 
                    
𝑛′  
𝑟′  3|𝑇| 
|𝑈| 
𝐻1 = 
0 
0 0 
𝐵 
 
Fig. 3. Matrix 𝐻1 [42] used to reduce TDM problem to PPSD problem.         
Now, assuming that a polynomial time algorithm exists 
which can solve any sample of PPSD problem. The matrix 𝐻1 
and the syndrome 𝒔 = (1, ⋯ , 1, 0, ⋯ , 0) consisting of 3|𝑇| ones 
followed by 𝑟′ zeros are the inputs of this algorithm. By 
executing this algorithm, we can realize in polynomial time 
whether the |𝑇| triple set in 𝐵 is a matching. When the 
|𝑇| = 2√𝑛 − 1 rows, the sum is the full-one vector is chosen 
from the |𝑈| top rows of 𝐻1. Solving a PPSD problem in a 
polynomial-time gives a polynomial solution for TDM 
problem. This implies a polynomial-time solution for every 
NP problem which in turn demonstrates that PPSD problem is 
NP-complete.                                                                            ■ 
Problem 3 [29]. Polar Parameterized Codeword Existence 
(PPCE) 
Instance: a binary matrix 𝐻𝑛×𝑟, 𝑛 = 2
𝑚, 𝑟 = 𝑛 − 𝑘 and a 
positive integer 𝜔 = 2√𝑛 − 1. 
Question: is there a codeword 𝒙 of Hamming weight at most 
𝜔 = 2√𝑛 − 1 such that 𝒙𝐻 = 0? 
Proposition 2. the PPCE problem is NP-complete. 
Proof. To prove the NP-completeness of PPCE problem, first 
the matrix 𝐶 (Fig. 4-a) is constructed [42]. Then, by inserting 
𝑛′′ = 𝑛 − 3|𝑇|(|𝑈| + 1) − |𝑈| full zero rows and 𝑟′′ = 𝑟 −
3|𝑇|(|𝑈| + 1) full zero columns to matrix 𝐶, it is expanded to 
matrix 𝐻2 of size 𝑛 × 𝑟 (Fig. 4-b). This extension is performed 
to get 𝐵  fitted to the PPCE problem’s properties. As a matter 
of fact, 𝐶 is a (3|𝑇||𝑈| + 3|𝑇| + |𝑈|) × (3|𝑇||𝑈| + 3|𝑇|) matrix 
in which |𝑈| first rows include the matrix 𝐵 followed by 3|𝑇| 
copies of the identity matrix 𝐼|𝑈|. Moreover, the 3|𝑇|(|𝑈| + 1) 
last rows of 𝐶 include an identity matrix 𝐼3|𝑇|(|𝑈|+1). Imagine 
that a polynomial-time algorithm exists which can solve any 
PPCE problem’s instance. Now, 𝐻2 and 𝜔 = 2√𝑛 − 1 are 
considered as the PPCE problem’s input. 
 7 
                    
3|𝑇| 
𝐵 𝐼|𝑈| ⋯ 𝐼|𝑈| 
𝐼3|𝑇|(|𝑈|+1) 
3|𝑇|(|𝑈| + 1) 
|𝑈| 
𝐶 = 
3|𝑇| copies 
3|𝑇|(|𝑈| + 1) 
 
                                                    (a) 
    
𝑛′′  
𝑟′′  
𝐻2 = 
0 
0 0 
𝐶 
3|𝑇|(|𝑈| + 1) 
3|𝑇|(|𝑈| + 1) + |𝑈| 
 
   (b) 
Fig. 4. (a) Matrix 𝐶 [42] used to reduce TDM problem to Subspace 
Weights problem.  (b). Matrix 𝐻2 is applied to reduce TDM problem to 
PPCE problem.         
There is need to realize the word with Hamming weight 
3|𝑇|2 + 4|𝑇| = 2√𝑛 − 1. In this way, the height 𝑛 =
(3|𝑇|2 + 4|𝑇| + 1)2 4⁄  of 𝐻2 is polynomial in |𝑇| and the 
extension from 𝐶 to 𝐻2 is feasible. Moreover, seooppu that 
𝒚 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, ⋯ , 𝑦3|𝑇|(|𝑈|+1)+|𝑈|, 0, ⋯ ,0) where 𝑛
′′ rightmost 
coordinates are zeros in such a way that 𝒚𝐻2 = 0. Consider 
𝒚0 = (𝑦1,  𝑦2, ⋯ ,  𝑦|𝑈|) and 𝒚1 = (𝑦|𝑈|+1, 𝑦|𝑈|+2, ⋯ , 𝑦3|𝑇|(|𝑈|+1)+|𝑈|) 
as the 𝒚’s subvectors. According to Fig. 4 (a, b), it is evident 
that 𝑤𝐻(𝒚1) = 𝑤𝐻(𝒚0𝐴) + 3|𝑇|𝑤𝐻(𝒚0). By adding 𝑤𝐻(𝒚0) to 
both sides of this equation, we have 𝑤𝐻(𝒚) = 𝑤𝐻(𝒚0𝐴) +
(3|𝑇| + 1)𝑤𝐻(𝒚0). In fact, 0 ≤ 𝑤𝐻(𝒚0𝐴) ≤ 3|𝑇| and 𝑤𝐻(𝒚0) can 
be specified from 𝑤𝐻(𝒚). When 𝑤𝐻(𝒚) is divided by 3|𝑇| + 1, 
𝑤𝐻(𝒚0𝐴) and 𝑤𝐻(𝒚0) are the remainder and quotient, 
respectively. If 𝑤𝐻(𝒚) = 3|𝑇|
2 + 4|𝑇|, we have 𝑤𝐻(𝒚0𝐴) = 3|𝑇| 
and 𝑤𝐻(𝒚0) = |𝑇|. Hence the code with parity check matrix 𝐻2 
has a word of Hamming weight 3|𝑇|2 + 4|𝑇| if and only if the 
set of |𝑇| triples in 𝐵 has a matching [3]. In fact, a solution to 
the PPCE problem is a sum of 4|𝑇|2 + 3|𝑇| rows summing to 
0. It is a solution to TDM problem and demonstrates that the 
PPCE problem is NP-complete.                                               ■                                                                
Proposition 3. Breaking the Polar variant of the McEliece 
cryptosystem is not easier than solving the decoding problem 
for a random code.   
Proof. This concludes from Propositions 1 and 2.                  ■ 
VI. PRACTICAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
In this section, we investigate the practical attacks against the 
PKC-PC. Generally, two types of practical attacks can be 
considered for the PKC-PC [43, 44]: (i) Structural attacks 
(key recovery attacks) whose aim is either at recovering the 
secret generator matrix 𝐺𝒜(𝑠) of the employed polar code from 
the public key 𝐺′ = 𝑆−1𝐺𝒜(𝑠)𝑃 or also distinguishing the public 
key 𝐺′ from a random matrix (which invalidates the reduction 
proof); (ii) Decoding (message recovery) attacks whose aim is 
to decode a noisy codeword that contains a message 𝒎 
without exploiting any obvious structure of the secret 
generator matrix 𝐺𝒜(𝑠).  
A. Brute Force Attack  
Brute force attack is a kind of structural attack in which, all 
probable keys are searched and investigated consistently until 
the proper key is detected. However, this attack is doomed to 
fail if the space of private key set is large enough. Therefore, 
the secret code employed in the PKC-PC should be randomly 
chosen among a very large class of equivalent polar codes. 
The original McEliece cryptosystem using Goppa code, is 
immune against this attack. In the PKC-PC, due to random 
selection of 𝑘 sub-channels from  𝑛 good sub-channels, the 
equivalent (𝑛, 𝑘) polar codes’ number and its dual are obtained 
as 𝒩𝒞 = (
𝑛
𝑘
) and 𝒩
𝒞┴
= (
𝑛
𝑛 − 𝑘
), respectively. This approach 
produces very large set of equivalent polar codes. For 
example, given a (256, 192) polar code, 𝒩𝒞 is approximately 
equal to 2204. In addition, there are so many possibilities for 
the nonsingular and permutation matrices used in the PKC-PC. 
The number of binary nonsingular scrambler matrices is equal 
to the number of all possible submatrices 𝐺𝑖,𝑗 of 𝐺𝑛 with 
indices 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒜(𝑠), this means that 𝒩𝑆 = 𝒩𝒞 = (
𝑛
𝑘
). If 𝑛 and 𝑘 
are properly chosen, 𝒩𝒞 is large enough. In this case, an 
adversary cannot detect 𝐺𝒜(𝑠) in polynomial-time. The number 
of binary permutation matrices 𝑃𝑛×𝑛 is computed as 𝒩𝑃 =
𝒩𝑃′ . 𝒩𝑃′′ = (
𝑛
𝑘
) × (𝑛 − 𝑘). Table II shows the average number 
of equivalent polar codes, nonsingular and permutation 
matrices for various code lengths 𝑛, dimension 𝑘 and rates 𝑅 =
0.75 and 𝑅 = 0.9. As shown in this table, due to the large 
parameters used in the PKC-PC, it is impossible to find 𝑆, 𝑃 
and 𝐺𝒜(𝑠) in polynomial time. 
TABLE II 
THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF EQUIVALENT POLAR CODES, NONSINGULAR AND 
PERMUTATION MATRICES FOR VARIOUS CODE LENGTHS, DIMENSIONS AND 
RATES 0.75 AND 0.9. 
(𝑛, 𝑘) 𝑅 𝒩𝒞 𝒩𝑆 𝒩𝑃 
(256,192) 0.75 2204 2204 2509 
(256,230) 0.9 2118 2118 2206 
(512,384) 0.75 2410 2410 2538 
(1024, 768) 0.75 2825 2825 21081 
(2048, 1536) 0.75 21656 21656 22168 
(4096, 3072) 0.75 23317 23317 ≫ 280 
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B. Key Recovery Attack  
In the distinguishing attack as a kind of algebraic attack, there 
is need to recognize the public key matrix from a randomly 
binary matrix by applying a distinguisher. This distinguisher, 
in its naive form can only invalidate the security reductions, 
and it can be more powerful if the distinguisher can reveal the 
hidden structure of the secret code. In [45], a deterministic 
distinguisher is proposed which is allowed to distinguish the 
matrix of a Goppa code from a random matrix. In fact, such 
distinguisher can solve Goppa code distinguishing (GCD) 
problem in polynomial-time for high code rates (near 1). The 
key ingredient of this method is an algebraic characterization 
of the key recovery problem and its idea is to consider the 
dimension of the solution space of a linearized system 
resulting from a particular polynomial system. We recall that 
the existence of such a distinguisher does not undermine the 
security of original McEliece cryptosystem. It is demonstrated 
that their security could not be reduced to the difficulty of 
random decoding of a linear code by means of GCD 
assumption. This kind of attacks, have better performance on 
some other cryptosystems using non binary Goppa codes [23, 
24] and also generalized Reed Solomon (GRS) codes [44] 
since it leads to recovery of the secret codes. However, due to 
the following reasons, these distinguishing attacks are 
ineffective against the PKC-PC: (i) it is unable to recognize 
the public key matrix of the PKC-PC from a randomly 
generated one, i.e., public key is resistant to this attack, 
because the public key 𝐺′ is not the generator matrix of polar 
codes. This is because of multiplying 𝑆−1 to 𝐺𝒜(𝑠)𝑃; (ii) the 
recognizer cannot work on subspaces of the code, hence it is 
impossible to detect the subspace that the attacker needs. 
In [35], Bardet et al. present a new key recovery attack by 
which Shrestha-Kim [34] polar code-based public key 
cryptosystem is broken. In fact, a new family of codes, called 
decreasing monomial codes, is suggested which consists as a 
special case, Reed-Muller codes and Polar codes. By means of 
these codes, low weight codewords in underlying polar code 
and its dual are obtained. Moreover, it is possible to recover 
the permuted polar code by enhancing all the information 
required for decrypting any message. It is shown that the code 
equivalence problem for binary polar codes can be solved 
efficiently by a more complicated algorithm with the help of 
the following four steps: The first step is searching for 
minimum weight codewords using Stern [46] and Dumer [47] 
algorithms. The second step is shortening the code with 
respect to the low weight codewords found in the first step and 
in the dual code. In the third step, by characterizing the 
permutation group of polar codes together with the low-weight 
codewords found in Step 2, it is possible to find, among the 
codewords found in Step 1, a subset of codewords which up to 
equivalence by the permutation group. The fourth step is to 
puncture the code with respect to the support of an element of 
minimum weight in this last subset of codewords gives a code 
of small length whose structure is known up to code 
equivalence. The code equivalence problem is then solved in 
this case and is used to recover step by step the underlying 
polar codes. 
It is shown that the only way to avoid this key recovery 
attack is to look for polar code parameters for which finding 
minimum weight codewords is unable either in the code or in 
its dual. This would require changing significantly the 
parameters proposed in Shrestha- Kim scheme that would 
make such scheme much less attractive. However, this attack 
is not applicable to the PKC-PC since we select a special kind 
of random subcode of polar codes instead of naïve form. This 
proper selection doesn’t allow solving of code equivalent 
problem. In fact, since the number of code equivalent for used 
polar code 𝒞 and its dual, i.e., 𝒩𝒞 and 𝒩𝒞┴, are large enough, 
the PKC-PC is immune against such key recovery attack. 
C. Information Set Decoding Attack  
 Information set decoding (ISD) attack is the most powerful 
kind of decoding attack that usually determines the work 
factor of code-based cryptosystems. ISD attack attempts to 
find the error vector 𝒆 in ciphertext by searching for the 
codewords with minimum weight in the given code extended 
by the received codeword, that is, the code described by the 
generator matrix [
𝐺
𝑐
]. This approach uses an ISD algorithm to 
search for the minimum weight codeword which is equivalent 
to find 𝒆. A naive form of ISD attack was introduced by 
Prange [48] and used in the original McEliece cryptosystem 
[5]. From then on, many subsequent variants were introduced 
[49-53]. One important step in the development of ISD attack 
is Stern attack [46] in which a probabilistic and explicit 
algorithm is presented to find low-weight codeword in an 
(𝑛, 𝑘) binary linear code. In this paper, we consider the Stern 
attack [46] to analyze the strength of the PKC-PC against ISD 
attack.  
 The inputs of this attack are as follows: (i) an integer 𝜔 ≥ 0; 
(ii) an (𝑛 − 𝑘) × 𝑛 parity check matrix 𝐻 or a 𝑘 × 𝑛 generator 
matrix 𝐺 of an (𝑛, 𝑘) polar code. Let us denote the work factor 
of ISD attack in a (𝑛, 𝑘) binary linear code to find a single 
codeword of weight 𝜔 by WFisd(𝑛, 𝑘, 𝜔). By applying the 
Stern algorithm, the ISD attack’s work factor is obtained as 
WFisd(𝑛, 𝑘, 𝜔) = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑇 𝑃𝑆𝑇⁄ , where the number of binary 
operations required to perform each iteration of  algorithm is 
calculated as 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑇 =
1
2
(𝑛 − 𝑘)2(𝑛 + 𝑘) + 2 (
𝑘/2
𝑝
) 𝑝ℓ + 2𝑝(𝑛 −
𝑘) (
𝑘/2
𝑝
)
2
/2ℓ and the success probability of finding a single 
codeword of weight 𝜔 is P𝑆𝑇 = (
𝑘/2
𝑝
)
2
(
𝑛 − 𝑘 − ℓ
𝜔 − 2𝑝
) (
𝑛
𝜔
)
−1
, 
0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝜔 and 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ 𝑛 − 𝑘 are two integers as the algorithm 
parameters whose size is determined in such a way that the 
complexity of attack is minimized [46].  
TABLE III 
WORK FACTOR (log2) OF ISD ATTACKS ON POLAR CODES WITH VARIOUS 
CODE LENGTHS AND DIMENSIONS FOR 𝑅 = 0.75. 
(𝑛, 𝑘) (𝑝, ℓ) 𝑤𝐻(𝒆) WF(𝑙𝑜𝑔2) 
 
PK (kByte) 
(256,192) (2,8) 31 79.96 1.5  
(512,384) (3,22) 44 104.61 6 
(1024, 768) (5,39) 63 140.63 24 
(2048, 1536) (7,59) 89 190.19 96 
(4096, 3072) (15,124) 127 266.34 384 
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TABLE IV 
WORK FACTOR (log2) OF ISD ATTACKS ON POLAR CODES WITH VARIOUS 
CODE RATES AND DIMENSIONS FOR 𝑛 = 1024, 𝑤𝐻(𝒆) = 63. 
𝑅 𝑘 (𝑝, ℓ) WF(𝑙𝑜𝑔2) 𝒩𝐶(𝑙𝑜𝑔2) PK (kByte) 
0.5 512 (3,27) 74.90 1018,67 32 
0.6 614 (3,27) 94.82 989.19 30.73 
0.7 717 (3,27) 122.41 897.00 26.87 
0.75 768 (5,39) 140.63 825.63 24 
0.8 819 (9,61) 163.70 734.65 20.49 
0.9 921 (5, 1) 247.98 477.56 11.58 
 
Some sets of polar codes parameters of 𝑅 = 0.75 with 
corresponding security level which are calculated by Stern 
algorithm is shown in Table III. Moreover, some other sets of 
polar codes parameters of length 𝑛 = 1024 for various code 
rates are given in Table IV. The results of Table IV show that 
the polar codes have a wide range of flexibility in code rate 
which make it possible to decrease the public key size at the 
cost of decreasing 𝒩𝒞. Since 𝒩𝒞 is still below the complexity 
of ISD attack, the work factor is determined by ISD attack. 
D. CCA2-Secure Version of the PKC-PC  
As mentioned earlier, in the PKC-PC, we use a systematic 
encryption matrix 𝐺′ = [𝐼𝑘|𝑄] as the public key which have the 
following advantages [43]: (i) the size of public key becomes 
much smaller, i.e., it requires 𝑘(𝑛 − 𝑘) bits instead of 𝑘𝑛 bits; 
(ii) the encryption is faster because it suffices to multiply the 
plaintext 𝒎 by  𝑘 × (𝑛 − 𝑘) submatrix 𝑄 instead of 𝑘 × 𝑛 
encryption matrix 𝐺′; (iii) the decryption is faster, because the 
message is a prefix of the ciphertext and can be recovered 
easily. However, using a systematic encryption matrix can 
lead to the loss of security against adaptive chosen ciphertext 
attack (CCA2). In such attacks, given a ciphertext 𝒄 of a 
message 𝒎, i.e., 𝒄 = 𝒎𝐺′ + 𝒆, the attacker inputs 𝒄 + 𝒎′𝐺′ to 
the decryption oracle for some 𝒎′ and obtains the outputs of 
decryption oracle as ?̅?. Then, the attacker can recover the 
message as 𝒎 = ?̅? − 𝒎′. Therefore, we should secure the 
PKC-PC against CCA2 to enable us use the systematic 
encryption matrix 𝐺′ without loss of security. In fact, the 
PKC-PC is CCA2-secure if an attacker with access to 
decryption oracle doesn’t have any advantage in deciphering a 
given ciphertext 𝒄. Also, indistinguishability against adaptive 
chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) is achieved if Alice 
encrypts one of two messages 𝒎1 and 𝒎2, 𝒎1 ≠ 𝒎2 to obtain 
a ciphertext 𝒄 and has no advantage in distinguishing the 
message.  
Several techniques were proposed to make the McEliece 
cryptosystem IND-CCA2 [54-58]. All suggested approaches 
in these conversions are based on scrambling the message 
inputs. In such way, any relation between two dependent 
messages which might be extracted by an attacker to recover 
the message is destroyed. It means that applying CCA2-secure 
conversion will enable us to perform a systematic generator 
matrix without loss of security. Two instances of generic 
conversions which can be applicable to the PKC-PC are 
Pointcheval conversion [55] and Fujisaki-Okamato conversion 
[54]. Although CCA2-secure scheme can be achieved by using 
the generic conversions [54, 55], they are not appropriate 
enough to be applied in the PKC-PC because these 
conversions add large amounts of redundancy to the 
ciphertexts. Instead, in the specific conversion, e.g., Kobara-
Imai γ-conversion [56], a data redundancy is reduced even for 
the large parameters. Hence, we apply Kobara-Imai γ-
conversion by which the data overhead is decreased compared 
with the generic conversions to have a CCA2-secure PKC-PC. 
It is indicated that breaking indistinguishability in the CCA2 
model using Kobara-Imai γ-conversion is as difficult as 
breaking the McEliece scheme [56].  
Another weakness of the PKC-PC is the malleability of the 
ciphertexts. In this case, the attacker can use the relation 
between two encrypted messages to determine the error bits. 
Let 𝒎1 and 𝒎2 be two messages that have a known relation Λ, 
e.g., Λ(𝒎1, 𝒎2) = 𝒎1 + 𝒎2. Let 𝒄1 = 𝒎1𝐺
′ + 𝒆1 and 𝒄2 =
𝒎2𝐺
′ + 𝒆2 be the corresponding ciphertexts of 𝒎1 and 𝒎2, 
respectively. In this case, 𝒄1 + 𝒄2 + Λ(𝒎1, 𝒎2) has the 
Hamming weight of less than 2𝑡 = 4√𝑛 − 2 and at least 𝑘 
error-free positions of 𝒎1 + 𝒎2 can be revealed. This property 
allows an attacker to guess the error bits. A special case of 
related messages occurs in the message-resend attack in which 
the attacker can recover 𝒆1 + 𝒆2 = 𝒄1 + 𝒄2. Another attack is a 
reaction attack, a weaker version of CCA2, in which the 
attacker changes a few bits of ciphertext and watches the 
reaction of the legitimate receiver on these changed bits. If the 
receiver cannot decode the ciphertext and hence requests to 
resend it, the corresponding bits are not in error originally. 
This enables the attacker to obtain the error-free information 
in at most 𝑘 iterations. It should be noted that using the 
Kobara-Imai γ-conversion makes the PKC-PC secure against 
practical attacks such as, related message attack [59], message 
resend attack, reaction attack [60] and malleability attack.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper introduced a variant of the McEliece public key 
cryptosystem based on polar codes, called as PKC-PC. It has a 
number of benefits such as larger information rate and smaller 
public key length in comparison with the McEliece 
cryptosystem. By using Kobara-Imaiʼs γ-conversion, we have 
attempted to have secure scheme against adaptive chosen 
ciphertext attacks. In this approach, we can convert the 
encryption matrix 𝐺′ to the systematic matrix which yields to 
reduce the public key length. We have shown that the PKC-
PC’s security is reduced to solve the NP-complete PPSD and 
PPCE problems. Also, the investigation’s results show the 
flexibility of the PKC-PC. To design a secure and efficient 
PKC-PC, the parameters such as code length, code dimension 
and the Hamming weight of the error vector should be chosen 
in such a way that a suitable tradeoff will be performed 
between security and efficiency. 
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